

JANESVILLE DAILY GAZETTE

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
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The Daily Gazette.

City of Janesville.

Saturday Evening, Dec. 26, 1864.

Official Paper of the City.



Forever float that standard sheet—

Where breathes the foe but falls before us?

With Freedom's soil beneath our feet,

And Freedom's banner streaming o'er us!

FOR MEMBER OF CONGRESS,
(Unexpired Term.)
WALTER D. MCINDOE,
of Marathon county.

Jeff Davis' Retaliatory Proclamation.

Read the account of the recent inhuman and fiendish proclamation of Jeff Davis. Those who can't sympathize with such a scoundrel, or who talk about the constitutional difficulties in punishing him or his supporters, must have lost their patriotism entirely, and become vile traitors themselves.

The Vicksburg Expedition.

It is understood that the expedition down the Mississippi river to attack Vicksburg, is now on the move. Gen. Sherman is in command of the land forces, and Com. Porter of the gunboats and transports. We shall soon hear from them.

Gen. Burnside's Testimony.

We publish Gen. Burnside's testimony in full, made before the committee on the conduct of the war. It is a frank and magnanimous statement, assuming the whole responsibility of the movement on Fredericksburg and its failure. He attempts no excuses, nor does he inculpate others, or endeavor to shun the responsibility upon other shoulders. He failed, and acknowledges it. He does not learn it too late, but promptly recognizes the fact, and immediately extricates his army from the consequences. It is an honorable failure, chivalrous in its acknowledgment, and the people will forgive him and tell him to "try again." He means fight, and that is what the people want. Go ahead, Burnside; attend to the pontoon bridges yourself next time, and not trust anything to the officials at Washington.

The War in North Carolina.

Gen. Foster's army having accomplished the object of its march to Goldsboro, by destroying the railroad communication between Richmond and Wilmington, and beaten the enemy in four fights, has returned to Newbern, preparatory to further operations. The General is now in Washington, asking for reinforcements. We hope none will be sent. Let us concentrate our armies. If Newbern is to be held, let Gen. Foster enlist loyal men, white and black, and thus fill up his army.

New Order by Gen. Curtis.

An important and very minute and stringent order has just been issued by General Curtis, defining the duties of provost marshals in the department of Missouri. It directs the arrest of all persons belonging to or enlisted in the confederate service found in the department; of all spies and saboteurs and abettors of the rebellion, either by word or deed; of all pretended loyal men who uphold their rebellious neighbors and relatives, and send them money or clothing. The arms and ammunition of the above classes of offenders are to be taken from them, and reported to headquarters. Disloyal preachers, "who have disgraced their profession by encouraging others to rebel, while they may have committed no other kind of disloyal act," are to be dealt with as rebels, and expelled from the state. All the above classes are to be tried by military power, and persons found guilty are to be sent to St. Louis with the evidence against them. Persons discouraging enlistments, or selling liquor to soldiers, are also to be arrested, and all railroad and steamboat employees must be loyal and have taken the oath of allegiance. All provost marshals are ordered to protect the freedom and persons of the slaves of rebels. Any disobedience to this regulation will be tried as a violation of military orders. No such slave must be confined in jail unless for crime.

The Milwaukee News is quite too officious in its interference in the senatorial question. It goes so far as to announce the name of Mr. Waldo, of Milwaukee, as a candidate, and certifies that he is "sound on the anti-slavery issues." Considering the position of the News on those issues, its testimony is of extremely doubtful character. The object of the News is appreciated, but it will not succeed.

SECTIONALISM.—The Chicago Times wants to "exclude the Puritan section from the future Union." The Cincinnati Enquirer says that the west is the tail of the New England kite. The Providence, Rhode Island, Post says it "will be discovered one of these days that New England can be kicked out of the Union." These are all democratic papers. They have been uncaring in their strictures for the "Union as it was," but they are now in for a new Union from which New England shall be excluded. These same papers have been horror struck at the objections made to the extension of slavery, because the operation was as they said sectional. Now this party has become outspoken in its endeavor to kick New England out of the Union."

Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

[Continued from 1st page.]
against an attack—in fact it was decidedly against it; I returned to my headquarters, and after conversation with Gen. Sumner, told him that I wanted him to order the 9th army corps, which was the corps I originally commanded, to form the next morning a column of attack by regiments; it consisted of some 18 old regiments, and some new ones, and desired the column to make a direct attack upon the enemy's works. I thought that these regiments by arriving quickly up after each other they would be able to carry the stone wall and the batteries front, forcing the enemy into their next line, and by going in with them they would not be able to fire upon us to any great extent. I left Gen. Sumner with that understanding, and directed him to give the orders. The order was given, and the order of attack was formed.

The next morning, just before the column was to have started, Gen. Sumner came to me and said: "General, I hope you will desist from this attack; I do not know of any general officer who approves of it, and I think it will prove disastrous to the army." Advice of that kind from Gen. Sumner, who has always been in favor of our advance whenever it was possible, caused me to hesitate. I kept the column of attack formed, and sent over for the division and corps commanders, and consulted with them. They unanimously voted against the attack. I then went over to see the other officers of the command on the other side, and found that the same opinion prevailed among them. I then sent for Gen. Franklin, who was then on the left, and he was of exactly the same opinion. This caused me to decide that I ought not to make the attack I had contemplated; and, besides, inasmuch as the President of the United States had told me not to be in haste in making the attack, that he would give me all the support he could, but he did not want the army of the Potomac destroyed, I felt that I could not take the responsibility of ordering the attack, notwithstanding my own belief at the time that the works of the enemy could be easily stormed and carried.

Q.—Do you, or not, understand that you were to be responsible for seeing that these orders were carried out?

A.—I did not. I never imagined for a moment that I had to carry out any thing that required to be done at Washington.

Gen. Meigs told me distinctly, several days ago, in Washington, that he never saw my plan of operations until I showed it to them on that day.

Q.—Do I understand you to say, in your statement, that you expected Gen. Franklin to carry the point at the extreme left of the ridge, in the rear of the town, and thereby enable our troops to storm and carry their fortifications?

A.—I did expect him to carry that point, which being done would have placed our forces in the rear of their extreme left, and I thought at the time would shak their forces on the ridge to such an extent that the position in front could be easily stormed and carried.

Q.—To what do you attribute the failure to accomplish that?

A.—To the great strength of the position and accumulation of the enemy's forces there. I expected that the bridges would be built in two or three hours after they were unloaded, which was about daylight.

Instead of that, those on the right were not built until 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and I had only the means of getting across one division over the bridge on the right.

Gen. Franklin's bridges were built about noon,

and were held by our troops on the opposite bank.

This gave the enemy time to accumulate their forces, which were stretched along the river from Port Royal up to the battle-field, before I was able to order the attack. There had been a great deal of division of opinion among the corps commanders as to the place of crossing; but, after all the discussion upon the subject, the decision to cross over here was well received and understood by all of them.

Q.—What was the conduct of the officers and men during the attack?

A.—With the exception of a single regiment it was excellent.

Q.—Have you any knowledge as to the forces of the enemy?

A.—It is estimated all the way from 100,000 to 200,000. I think it was less than 100,000. I would add here that, although at the time I ordered the column of attack to be formed on the morning of the battle, I thought the enemy's works could be carried, and adhered to that opinion during that day. I afterwards became convinced that that could not have been done owing to the great strength of the enemy, the time given them for reinforcing, and the belief also of our officers that it could not be done. I accordingly telegraphed to the President of the United States that I withdraw our army because I felt the enemy's position could not be carried.

Gen. Rigg succeeds the late Gen. Hooker in the command of his cavalry division.

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
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The Daily Gazette.

City of Janesville.

Saturday Evening, Dec. 26, 1862.

Official Paper of the City.



Forever float that standard sheet—
Where breathes the foe but falls before us?
With Freedom's soil beneath our feet,
And Freedom's banner streaming o'er us!

FOR MEMBER OF CONGRESS,
[Unexpired Term.]
WALTER D. MC INDOE,
of Marathon county.

Jeff Davis' Retaliatory Proclamation.

Read the account of the recent inhuman and fiendish proclamation of Jeff Davis. Those who can sympathize with such a scoundrel, or who talk about the constitutional difficulties in punishing him or his supporters, must have lost their patriotism entirely, and become vile traitors themselves.

The Vicksburg Expedition.

It is understood that the expedition down the Mississippi river to attack Vicksburg, is now on the move. Gen. Sherman is in command of the land forces, and Com. Porter of the gunboats and transports. We shall soon hear from them.

Gen. Burnside's Testimony.

We publish Gen. Burnside's testimony in full, made before the committee on the conduct of the war. It is a frank and magnanimous statement, assuming the whole responsibility of the movement on Fredericksburg and its failure. He attempts no excuses, nor does he inculpate others, or endeavor to shuffle the responsibility upon other shoulders. He failed, and acknowledges it. He does not learn it too late, but promptly recognizes the fact, and immediately extricates his army from the consequences. It is an honorable failure, chivalrous in its acknowledgment, and the people will forgive him and tell him to "try again." He means fight, and that is what the people want. Go ahead, Burnside; attend to the pontoon bridges yourself next time, and not trust anything to the officials at Washington.

The War in North Carolina.

Gen. Foster's army having accomplished the object of its march to Goldsboro, by destroying the railroad communication between Richmond and Wilmington, and beaten the enemy in four fights, has returned to Newbern, preparatory to further operations. The General is now in Washington, asking for reinforcements. We hope none will be sent. Let us concentrate our armies. If Newbern is to be held, let Gen. Foster enlist loyal men, white and black, and thus fill up his army.

New Order by Gen. Curtis.

An important and very minute and stringent order has just been issued by General Curtis, defining the duties of provost marshals in the department of Missouri. It directs the arrest of all persons belonging to or enlisted in the confederate service found in the department; of all spies and aiders and abettors of the rebellion, either by word or deed; of all pretended loyal men who uphold their rebellious neighbors and relatives, and send them money or clothing. The arms and ammunition of the above classes of offenders are to be taken from them, and reported to headquarters. Disloyal preachers, "who have disgraced their profession by encouraging others to rebel, while they may have committed no other kind of disloyal act," are to be dealt with as rebellious, and expelled from the state. All the above classes are to be tried by military power, and persons found guilty are to be sent to St. Louis with the evidence against them. Persons discouraging enlistments, or selling liquor to soldiers, are also to be arrested, and all railroad and steamboat employees must be loyal and have taken the oath of allegiance. All provost marshals are ordered to protect the freedom and persons of the slaves of rebels. Any disobedience to this regulation will be tried as a violation of military orders. No such slave must be confined in jail unless for crime.

The Milwaukee News is quite too officious in its interference in the senatorial question. It goes so far as to announce the name of Mr. Waldo, of Milwaukee, as a candidate, and certifies that he is "sound on the anti-slavery issues." Considering the position of the News on those issues, its testimony is of extremely doubtful character. The object of the News is appreciated, but it will not succeed.

SECTIONALISM.—The Chicago Times wants to "exclude the Pariian section from the future Union." The Cincinnati Enquirer says that the west is the tail of the New England kite. The Providence, Rhode Island, Post says it "will be discovered one of these days that New England can be kicked out of the Union." These are all democratic papers. They have been unceasing in their shrieks for the "Union as it was," but they are now in for a new Union from which New England shall be excluded. These same papers have been: horror struck at the objections made to the extension of slavery, because the operation was as they said sectional. Now this party has become outspoken in its endeavor to kick New England out of the Union."

Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

[Omitted from 1st page.]
against an attack—in fact it was decided against it; I returned to my headquarters, and after conversation with Gen. Sumner, told him that I wanted him to order the 9th army corps, which was the corps I originally commanded, to form the next morning a column of attack by regiments; it consisted of 18 old regiments, and some new ones, and desired the column to make a direct attack upon the enemy's works. I thought that these regiments by arriving quickly up after each other they would be able to carry the stone wall and the batteries front, forcing the enemy into their next line, and by going in with them the world would not be able to fire upon us to any great extent. I left Gen. Sumner with that understanding, and directed him to give the orders. The order was given, and the order of attack was formed.

The next morning, just before the column was to have started, Gen. Sumner came to me and said: "General, I hope you will desist from this attack; I do not know of any general officer who approves of it, and I think it will prove disastrous to the army." Advice of that kind from Gen. Sumner, who has always been in favor of our advance whenever it was possible, caused me to hesitate. I kept the column of attack formed, and sent over for the division and corps commanders, and consulted with them. They unanimously voted against the attack. I then went over to see the other officers of the command on the other side, and found that the same opinion prevailed among them. I then sent for Gen. Franklin, who was then on the left, and he was of exactly the same opinion. This caused me to decide that I ought not to make the attack I had contemplated; and, besides, inasmuch as the President of the United States had told me not to be in haste in making the attack, that he would give me all the support he could, but he did not want the army of the Potowmec destroyed. I felt that I could not take the responsibility of ordering the attack, notwithstanding my own belief at the time that the works of the enemy could be carried. In the afternoon of that day I again saw the officers and told them that I had decided to withdraw to this side of the river all our forces except enough to hold the town and the bridge-heads, but should keep the bridges there for future operations, in case we wanted to cross again. I accordingly ordered the withdrawal, leaving Gen. Hooker to conduct the withdrawal of the corps from the town, and Gen. Franklin to conduct it on our left. During that evening I received a note from Gen. Hooker, and about 10 o'clock at night Gen. Butterfield came over with a message from Gen. Hooker, stating that he (Gen. Hooker) felt it his duty to represent to me the condition in which I was leaving the town and the troops in it. After a long conversation on the subject with Gen. Butterfield, I left that the troops I proposed to leave behind would not be able to hold the town. I then partially decided to withdraw the whole command, a still more perilous operation. It commenced raining, which to some extent was an assistance to us, but was a very bad thing in the moving of the troops. I thought over the matter for about two hours, and about one o'clock I sent over an order to withdraw the whole force, which was successfully accomplished. There had been a great deal of division of opinion among the corps commanders as to the place of crossing; but, after all the discussion upon the subject, the decision to cross over here was well received, I understood, by all of them. While on his way here, Gen. Hooker, on the morning of the 20th of November, wrote me a note, which I received on the 21st, in which he suggested that he should cross his force over the Rappahannock at the ford nearest the town, Richard's Ford, and move rapidly down to Saxon's Station, and take position there. He stated that he had three days' provisions, and thought he could meet any force of the enemy in front of them. I replied to him that I was always very glad to take the advice of my general officers, and should always be loth to make a move without consulting them; but I could not approve of the move he had suggested, because, in the first place, he would have to march some thirty-six miles to get to Saxon's Station. It was raining, and he would have to ford two rivers, which might rise and cut him off from the main body of the command; and as I had no means of crossing at Fredericksburg, I would be prevented from sending him supplies and assistance; and although he might reach Saxon's Station and not meet any force of the enemy at that time, yet it would be a very hazardous movement to throw a column like that beyond the reach of its proper support. This reply I sent to Gen. Hooker by his aide-de-camp; he thanked me, and said he had only made it as a suggestion, and the weather, as it was then raining, of course rendered it impossible to make the movement he had suggested.

Question.—What reason do you assign for the failure of your attack?

Answer.—It was found impossible to get the men up the works. The enemy's fire was too hot. The whole command fought most gallantly. The enemy themselves say they never saw our men fight so hard as upon that day.

Q.—Were the enemy's works very strong?

A.—There works were not strong works, but they held strong positions. It is possible the points of attack were wrong ordered. If such is the case, I can only say I did to the best of my ability. It is also possible that we would have done well to have crossed at Snicker's Neck, but for what I supposed to be good reasons I felt we had better cross here, that we would have a more decisive engagement here, and that, if we succeeded in defeating them, we would break up the whole of the army here, which I think now is the most desirable thing, for it would be impossible to make the movement he had suggested.

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BY TELEGRAPH.

REPORTED FOR THE DAILY GAZETTE.
BY WISCONSIN STATE TELEGRAPH LINE.
Official Union Passenger Depot.

To-Day's Report.

[Reported Exclusively for the Daily Gazette.]

MORNING DISPATCHES.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 26.

Special to Times.—Official information from Mexico represents the condition of the French army as most critical, their ranks being thinned by sickness and want of wholesome food. Agents have been sent to this country for supplies of various kinds, and empowered to make large contracts for future use. These have been reached the Mexican minister here, he has entered his solemn protest against such supplies being allowed to go forward. Secretary Seward, however, declines to interfere. The complaint is made that the evil even extends to French privileges denied to Mexico.

—Do I understand you say, in your statement, that you expected Gen. Franklin to carry the point at the extreme left of the ridge, in the rear of the town, and thereby enable our troops to storm and carry their fortifications?

—I did not. I never imagined for a moment that I had to carry out any thing that required to be done at Washington. Gen. Meigs told me distinctly, several days ago, in Washington, that he never saw my plan of operations until I showed it to them on that day.

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—Q.—What do you attribute the failure to accomplish that?

—A.—To the great strength of the position and accumulation of the enemy's forces there. I expected that the bridges would be built in two or three hours after they were unloaded, which was about daylight. Instead of that, those on the right were not built until 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and I had only the means of getting across one division over the bridge on the right. Gen. Franklin's bridges were built about noon, and were held by our troops on the opposite bank. This gave the enemy time to accumulate their forces, which were stretched along the river from Port Royal up to the battle field, before I was able to order the attack. There had been a great deal of division of opinion among the corps commanders as to the place of crossing; but, after all the discussion upon the subject, the decision to cross over here was well received and understood by all of them.

—Q.—What was the conduct of the officers and men during the attack?

—A.—With the exception of a single regiment it was excellent.

—Q.—Have you any knowledge as to the force of the enemy?

—A.—It is estimated all the way from 100,000 to 200,000. I think it was less than 100,000. I would add here that, although at the time I ordered the column of attack to be formed on the morning of the battle, I thought the enemy's works could be carried, and adhered to that opinion during that day. I afterwards became convinced that that could not have been done owing to the great strength of the enemy, and when captured the officer capturing him shall instantly hang him; also of our officers that it could not be done. I accordingly telegraphed to the President of the United States that I withdrew our army because I felt the enemy's position could not be carried.

—Burnside's testimony here closed.

Decisions of the Commissioners of Internal Revenue.

The commissioner of internal revenue has made the following decisions:

Concerning Claims for Taxes Improperly Paid.—Claims for taxes improperly paid under the existing law may be made to the commissioner of internal revenue, through the collectors of the respective districts,

and the certificates under whose supervision the taxes were assessed.

The proclamation is dated Richmond,

December 23, 1862.

—N.Y.—Latest advice from Galveston, Texas, represent that all is quiet. A vessel arrived there last evening from New Orleans the 12th. All quiet there, and at Newbern, N.C. The Niagara was taken down the St. Lawrence and round the coast and showed her weakness on that voyage. Many predicted that she would never reach her destination.

The next we heard of the Niagara she had been chartered to the government for ten thousand dollars per month and her crew found to be used as a transport. We presume that she has been under pay ever since.

The Niagara was a common lake passenger boat when new, has been over eighteen years in the water, and has probably run more than five hundred thousand miles.

She took on board five hundred men of the Massachusetts 50th at New York, (by far too large a number at any time,) and started for Europe to-day, with the avowed purpose of using her as a market-boat in the waters about New York. The Niagara was taken down the St. Lawrence and round the coast and showed her weakness on that voyage. Many predicted that she would never reach her destination.

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